HACCLE: An Ecosystem for Building Secure Multi-Party Computations by Bao, Yuyan et al.
HACCLE: An Ecosystem for Building Secure Multi-Party Computations
Yuyan Bao
Purdue University
Kirshanthan Sundararajah
Purdue University
Raghav Malik
Purdue University
Qianchuan Ye
Purdue University
Christopher Wagner
Purdue University
Fei Wang
Purdue University
Mohammad Hassan Ameri
Purdue University
Donghang Lu
Purdue University
Alexander Seto
Purdue University
Benjamin Delaware
Purdue University
Roopsha Samanta
Purdue University
Aniket Kate
Purdue University
Christina Garman
Purdue University
Jeremiah Blocki
Purdue University
Pierre-David Letourneau
Reservoir Labs
Benoit Meister
Reservoir Labs
Jonathan Springer
Reservoir Labs
Tiark Rompf
Purdue University
Milind Kulkarni
Purdue University
Abstract
Cryptographic techniques have the potential to enable dis-
trusting parties to collaborate in fundamentally new ways, but
their practical implementation poses numerous challenges. An
important class of such cryptographic techniques is known
as secure multi-party computation (MPC). Deploying secure
MPC protocols in realistic scenarios requires extensive knowl-
edge spanning multiple areas of cryptography and systems
even for seemingly simple applications. And while the steps to
arrive at a solution for a particular application are pedestrian,
it remains difficult to make the implementation efficient, and
cumbersome to apply those same steps to a slightly different
application from scratch. Hence, it is an important problem
to design an ecosystem for building secure MPC applica-
tions with minimum effort and using techniques accessible to
non-experts in cryptography.
In an effort to provide such an ecosystem for building se-
cure MPC applications using higher degrees of automation,
we present the HACCLE (High Assurance Compositional
Cryptography: Languages and Environments) toolchain. The
HACCLE toolchain contains an embedded domain-specific
language (Harpoon) for software developers without crypto-
graphic expertise to write MPC-based programs. Harpoon
programs are compiled into acyclic circuits represented in
HACCLE’s Intermediate Representation (HIR) that serves as
an abstraction for implementing a computation using different
cryptographic protocols such as secret sharing, homomorphic
encryption, or garbled circuits. Implementations of different
cryptographic protocols serve as different backends of our
toolchain. The extensible design of HIR allows cryptographic
experts to plug in new primitives and protocols to realize
computations.
We have implemented HACCLE, and used it to program
interesting algorithms and applications (e.g., secure auction,
matrix-vector multiplication, and merge sort). We show that
the performance is improved by using our optimization strate-
gies and heuristics.
1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables a group of
distrusting parties to jointly perform computations without
revealing any participant’s private data that they do not wish
to share with others. It has broad practical applications, e.g.,
Yao’s millionaires problem [42], secure auctions [4], voting,
privacy-preserving network security monitoring [6], privacy-
preserving genomics [22, 41], private stable matching [15],
ad conversion [23], spam filtering on encrypted email [19]
and privacy-preserving machine learning [13]. Secure MPC
applications are generally realized as circuits communicating
information – both private and public – among parties.
Although MPC techniques and protocols have seen much
success in the cryptography community, it is still challeng-
ing to build practical MPC applications by utilizing these
techniques. Executing cryptographic protocols is notoriously
slow, due to the encryption and communication overhead. The
largest benchmark reported in Fairplay [28] – a secure two-
party computation system – was finding the median of two
sorted input arrays containing ten 16-bit numbers from each
party. Running the benchmark required execution of 4383
gates, and took over 7 seconds on a local area network. While
improving computing capabilities and network bandwidth,
implementation techniques can contribute to 3-4 orders of
magnitude improvements [17]. These techniques include op-
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timizations that reduce the number of gates and the depth of
a circuit and reduce the computational costs of executing a
cryptographic protocol. However, such optimizations do not
exist in general-purpose compiler frameworks.
While several MPC frameworks have been proposed [3,
7, 12, 14, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 39, 40, 43–45], they either pro-
vide low-level cryptographic primitives or provide high-level
abstractions like traditional programming languages. The low-
level frameworks provide high degrees of customized protocol
execution, but the users are generally expected to be experts
in either one or both of cryptography and optimizing circuits.
These MPC frameworks provide little or no type safety to pre-
vent semantic errors, and it is difficult to write applications in a
way that is portable across different protocols. The high-level
frameworks provide traditional programming abstractions
that hide the data-oblivious nature of secure computations
from programmers. But these frameworks are tied to only one
or a few protocols and their compilation procedures – from
high-level abstractions to low-level primitives – are not easy
to extend to perform application specific optimizations [43].
Contributions The main intellectual contribution of this
paper is a toolchain for building secure MPC applications
called HACCLE (High Assurance Compositional Cryptogra-
phy: Languages and Environments). Our framework contains
an embedded domain-specific language (eDSL) Harpoon for
designing MPC-based applications. Allowing seamless con-
struction of MPC-based applications by software developers
without expertise in advanced cryptography is the main pur-
pose of providing such a high-level programming language.
A Harpoon program is compiled to an acyclic combinational
circuit, which is described in a HACCLE Intermediate Rep-
resentation (HIR). HIR exposes the essential data-oblivious
nature of MPC, and allows cryptography experts to experi-
ment with new primitives and protocols. Our framework also
provides a specialized backend for estimating the resource us-
age (e.g.compute time and memory space) prior to execution.
This paper makes the following specific contributions:
• HACCLE Toolchain: A compilation framework to
build and execute MPC applications written in Harpoon –
an embedded domain-specific language (eDSL) in Scala.
• HACCLE Intermediate Representation (HIR): Ex-
tensible circuit-like intermediate representation tailored
to abstract cryptographic primitives used in MPC.
• Optimization Strategies: Methods for optimizing the
MPC application by specialization as it flows through
each stage of our HACCLE toolchain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background on cryptographic protocols involved in
secure MPC and motivates the need for an ecosystem to build
MPC-based applications. We describe the key impediments
for building practical MPC applications with the example of
secure auctions. Section 3 describes the HACCLE toolchain
and associated workflow. Section 4 illustrates HIR, the key
component of our compiler. Section 5 describes the optimiza-
tions implemented in our compiler toolchain. Section 6 dis-
cusses our toolchain on three case studies in detail. Section 7
summarizes related work and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Motivating Example and Background
As an example of secure MPC, consider online auctions. On-
line auctions have great practical importance and different
models are widely used by eBay, Google AdWords and Face-
book. In general, a secure online auction works as follows.
Buyers place their sealed bids on items and the highest bid-
der is chosen to buy the item. In this setup, parties are not
permitted to know others’ bids, unlike in an English auction
where the auctioneer starts with a minimum price and buyers
openly shout out their bids. Hence, conducting successful
secret auctions in the absence of a trusted authority requires
cryptographic techniques to preserve the secrecy of bids while
performing necessary computations such as finding the high-
est bidder. One of the significant use cases of secure auctions
is procurement via a competitive bidding process, where no
participant trusts each other, including the auctioneer. While
a trusted third party handling the auction may be acceptable
when the items under auction have low value, this is generally
a less desirable option in high-value and corruption-prone
environments such as procurement for public construction
contracts.
There are many different types of auction policies studied
by economists and game theorists. An auction where the high-
est bidder is chosen to buy the item by paying the highest bid
is known as a first-price auction. A second-price or Vickrey
auction [38] is a well-known auction policy where the highest
bidder is chosen to buy the item by paying the second highest
price. Second-price auctions provide buyers with the incentive
to bid their true valuation and does not allow for price discov-
ery (i.e., no ramping up prices). Hence, second-price auctions
are especially suitable for high-value low-trust environments
such as public procurements. Second-price auctions also ap-
ply to settings where multiple items are auctioned and bids
may have additional structure, such as if/then conditions, that
need to be taken into account for comparison. Such settings
are described as generalized second-price auctions. Given
that secrecy of the bids is preserved, the computations re-
quired when a single item is auctioned are simpler than when
multiple items are auctioned. Hence it is desirable both from
programmability and efficiency viewpoints that the online
auction application is written once for the general case and
gets automatically and correctly specialized for the desired
number of items, number of bidders, comparison logic, etc.
We will discuss an implementation in our HACCLE toolchain
in more detail in Section 6.1.
To continue with necessary background on cryptography,
we first take a look at Secret Sharing – a cryptographic tech-
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nique that allows to perform computations on secret data.
Secret sharing Secret sharing [35] is a cryptographic tech-
nique that distributes a piece of secret data amongst a group
of parties and allows the secret to be reconstructed only when
a sufficient portion of shares are combined. A (t,n)-secret
sharing allows the secret s to be split into n shares. Any t−1
of the shares reveal no information about s, while any t shares
allow complete reconstruction of the secret s.
The SPDZ [12] and HoneyBadgerMPC [27] frameworks
serve as our secret sharing backends and provide Python-
style programming environments for writing custom MPC
programs. These frameworks let developers express MPC pro-
grams (e.g., second-price auction) as arithmetic expressions.
Constructing the most efficient MPC programs is the major
challenge faced by developers. First, developers constantly
think about the depth of the overall circuit results from their
arithmetic expressions (e.g., performing a linear reduction
over a list of elements can be realized as a balanced tree re-
duction with smaller depth). Second, developers must have a
good understanding of the cost of every primitive operation
(e.g., logically similar usage of different comparison oper-
ators may yield different costs). Challenges faced here are
significantly different from writing an efficient program in
the traditional setting and can be successfully overcome by a
compiler.
Homomorphic Encryption Cloud computing is a scenario
where one’s privacy may be violated. In this scenario, one
party wants to perform computations by outsourcing to an-
other (possibly untrusted) party, e.g., training machine learn-
ing models on private data on a public cloud server. This can
be achieved by homomorphic encryption, another important
cryptographic primitive. Homomorphic encryption enables
operations on encrypted data without access to the secret key.
The existing fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes
are lattice-based constructions, and their security mainly relies
on hardness assumptions of Learning With Error (LWE) prob-
lems. PALISADE [1], TFHE [10], and HElib [34] serve as
our FHE backends. They all implement asymmetric protocols
that use a pair of public and private keys for encryption and
decryption. TFHE implements a very fast gate-by-gate boot-
strapping mechanism [8, 9]. The TFHE library allows to eval-
uate an arbitrary Boolean circuit composed of binary gates,
over encrypted data, without revealing any information. HE-
lib implements the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV)
scheme [5], along with many optimizations to make homomor-
phic evaluation run faster, focusing mostly on effective use
of the Smart-Vercauteren cipher text packing techniques [36]
and the Gentry-Halevi-Smart optimizations [18]. The PAL-
ISADE library supports the BGV, BFV, and CKKS schemes
and a more secure variant of the TFHE scheme, including
bootstrapping. In cryptography, ciphertext and plaintext mean
private information and public information respectively. In
this paper, we may use those terms interchangeably.
Garbled Circuits Yao’s Garbled circuits [42] is a two-party
secure computation scheme for Boolean circuits against semi-
honest adversaries. The main idea is that for each of the
Boolean gates, one party (the circuit generator) generates
a list of keys corresponding to all possible outputs, each en-
crypted by two keys corresponding to the two inputs that
generates that output. This way, when the other party (the
evaluator) reaches the gate, the evaluator should have two
keys corresponding to the values of the two inputs, which
means the evaluator will be able to correctly decrypt one of
the values, and be able to continue on to the next gate. Obliv-
C [43] is the library that we use to support Yao’s Garbled
Circuits protocols.
System Model and Communication Model There are two
popular system models for multi-party computation. The
MPC-as-a-service setting allows some parties to play the
role of servers and provide MPC services to clients with pri-
vate input. The other setting is where the parties running
the MPC protocols are the participants who provide the in-
put. The HACCLE toolchain does not force users to pick
one specific setting; instead, the user should pick the proper
setting and keep that setting in mind when developing pro-
grams. Similarly, the HACCLE toolchain does not enforce
any communication model. The parties/machines could be
fully connected, could form a star network structure, or could
be any specified structure. As long as the network structure is
supported by one of HACCLE’s backends, HACCLE should
be able to compile the programs.
Adversary Models Moreover, building MPC applications
requires one to understand the security assumptions of an
MPC library, e.g., the adversary models. There are two major
adversary models: semi-honest and malicious. A semi-honest
adversary follows the protocol, but tries to learn as much as
possible from the messages they receive from other parties.
A malicious adversary has the same powers of a semi-honest
one in analyzing the protocol execution. In addition to that, it
may also control, manipulate, or arbitrarily inject messages to
the network. In HACCLE, programmers are only required to
provide a model of choice and the toolchain will pick proper
sub-protocols to build up the MPC programs satisfying the
adversary model described.
Offline Phase The offline/online paradigm is applied by
many MPC protocols and frameworks, where the online phase
makes use of a buffer of preprocessed input-independent val-
ues that are created during the offline phase. Due to the fact
that these values are independent of the input of the program,
the MPC framework can run the offline phase to prepare them
before the online program begins. The online phase is then
the actual phase where clients/users provide their input and
get expected output; this online phase can gain a significant
speed-up with the help of the offline phase. A number of
preprocessing values are required for doing multiplication
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and comparison. For example, each multiplication between
secret shares consumes one random "Beaver’s triple", and
each comparison would costs some triples and random shared
bits. The volume of preprocessing data depends on the on-
line phase, and, as such, it would be hard for programmers
with no security expertise to work out those requirements. In
HACCLE, the programmer need not care about those secret
parameters, but rather only describes the function computed
by the program and the intended private information, and the
HACCLE toolchain will parse the program and work out the
proper settings for the offline phase.
3 HACCLE Workflow
Scala Program with
Harpoon embedded
Harpoon program
HIR 
(protocol-independent)
HIR (…)
Backend Resource 
Estimates
…
Resource 
Estimation 
Graph
Obliv-C
code
SPDZ 
code
HIR 
(garbled circuits)
HIR 
(secret sharing)
Compiler stage
Input 
params
1
2
3
4
Figure 1: HACCLE Compilation Framework
In this section, we describe the flow of our HACCLE com-
pilation framework. Figure 1 shows an overview of the com-
pilation flow. The secure multiparty programs are written in
Scala and the core portion of the computation is written in
Harpoon, an eDSL. In the very first stage of the compilation
flow, the input program is staged to a complete Harpoon pro-
gram that consists of an entry point for passing the inputs
provided by the parties, computations on those inputs and
necessary revealing of results to the parties. The Harpoon
program is compiled to a protocol independent multi-level
intermediate representation, HACCLE Intermediate Repre-
sentation (HIR). Computation represented by HIR is one big
acyclic circuit. Section 4 illustrates attributes of HIR with
examples. The program represented in HIR is further lowered
to include protocol specific instructions. Finally, from the low-
level HIR program code generation happens for respective
protocol specific backends. Resource estimation is one of the
special note-worthy backends that instead of executing the
computation, it estimates the amount of resources required to
realize the computation using a specific protocol. The follow-
ing subsections illustrates the stages of our toolchain from
writing the MPC application as a program to executing it
using different cryptographic protocols.
3.1 Specifying the Program
A programmer starts by providing a Scala program that em-
beds a secure computation. The secure computation is written
in Harpoon, our language for expressing multiparty computa-
tions (Section 4.2). The Scala program runs at client locations,
and is responsible for processing input, setting up communi-
cation channels, etc. The Harpoon program actually performs
the secure computation. This secure computation is written
parametrically: effectively, a Harpoon program is a function
that accepts the number of parties and their inputs as parame-
ters.
3.2 Generating a Circuit
Stage 1 The first stage of compilation transforms the Scala
+ Harpoon program into a pure Harpoon program. In other
words, executing the Scala program stages away the non-
Harpoon portions of the code: local input files are read and
represented in memory, connections are set up to the relevant
servers.
What is left after the stage 1 compilation is a Harpoon
program that represents just the secure computation that must
be performed. This program will eventually be transformed
into a circuit that performs the desired secure processing.
However, the secure computation is not ready for execution
yet. Any publicly known information about the inputs (e.g.,
the bitwidths, or a maximum number input size) has not yet
been incorporated into the circuit, and, of course, the input
values are not yet known.
Crucially, a Harpoon program can have loops and recursive
functions, but a programmer must provide upper bounds on
the running time of those constructs that are derivable from
publicly-known information. Note that a common piece of
publicly available information about the input that may be
used to define the bounds is the bitwidth of the input; but any
other information about the input that is publicly known to all
participants may also be used to generate the HIR program.
The key typing guarantee that Harpoon provides is that
private data will not leak via public channels.
An important note here is that each Harpoon program repre-
sents a single secure computation that will compile to a single
circuit. Hence, the Harpoon program must compile down to a
circuit whose size is determined only by the publicly available
information about the inputs (to avoid leaking information).
In many applications, there are multiple secure computations
that must occur (e.g., in database application, there may be
multiple queries; each query represents a different secure com-
putation). Here, we leverage the blurred distinction between
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compile time and runtime. Generating a Harpoon program
happens at what programmers traditionally consider run time:
the Scala program is actually running to produce the Harpoon
program. Hence, the Scala program can include a loop over
the set of queries, and for each query, a new Harpoon program
will be produced and compiled and executed. The abstrac-
tion in Scala has no runtime overhead for the generated code
since it is executed at the Scala runtime, offering the so-called
“abstraction without regret” (Section 4.1).
Stage 2 The next step is to generate an abstract circuit: the
Harpoon program is compiled down to the HACCLE Interme-
diate Representation (HIR, Section 4), which is, essentially, a
functional, bounded-size representation of the program. Here,
the bounds information in the Harpoon program is used to un-
roll loops and inline recursive functions, leading to a function-
and loop-free representation of the program. Because there
are no longer any looping constructs, the HIR program is nat-
urally single-assignment and functional. HIR supports scalars
and arrays of bits, integers, and floats. An HIR program at
this stage is still independent of a particular protocol. Hence,
it is essentially a direct translation of the Harpoon program
into HIR without considering the abilities of any particular
backend.
The key typing guarantee that HIR provides at this level
is that the appropriate HIR operation will be used based on
whether inputs to an operation are private or public. For exam-
ple, indexing into an array of private data using a public index
produces different code (essentially, copying a particular wire)
from indexing into an array of private data using a private in-
dex (essentially, using a selector construct to securely choose
the appropriate element).
Stage 3 The next compilation stage specializes an HIR
circuit to a specific protocol. The choice of protocol is de-
termined by the security specification file. Here, we do not
change the language representation of the program—the re-
sulting program is still in HIR. Instead, this stage rewrites
HIR to limit the use of HIR operations to those supported by
a particular backend. For example, a backend that only sup-
ports Boolean operations requires translating all operations
on integers and floating point into bit-level operations. Simi-
larly, a backend that only supports operations on integers will
require translating floating point operations into decomposed
operations on the component parts (mantissa and exponent).
Here, HIR switches to the use of backend-specific type sys-
tems that enforces the following property: a backend-specific
HIR circuit that type checks will correctly enforce the re-
quirements of that backend for security (e.g., ensuring that
the set of sharers matches up when performing operations in
a secret-sharing backend).
Stage 4 The final step of generating a circuit is specific to
the backend implementation the HACCLE framework is in-
stantiated with. Here, the HIR circuit is translated to work
with the particular backend (this is the key module interface
provided by our system). This may require translating the
circuit to a set of API calls (e.g., our TFHE backend), or
transliterating the circuit into a different programming lan-
guage (e.g., translating to Obliv-C for the garbled-circuit back-
end, or Scale-Mamba for the secret-sharing backend). The
backend is configured based on the information in the security
specification file.
At this point, the circuit is in an executable form, and it
will execute, using the actual inputs from the various parties,
to perform the desired secure computation.
3.3 Resource estimation
Resource estimation is implemented as another backend. Here,
protocol-specific HIR code, rather than being translated to
work with a specific backend, will be translated into a graph
representation of the circuit. This graph representation is
then incorporated into a resource estimation program that
traverses this graph in various ways to compute different
resource estimates: total amount of work, critical path length,
FHE levels, etc.
4 Compiler
HACCLE toolchain uses lightweight modular staging (LMS)
to support our towers of abstractions. Staging is a technique
for building extensible, flexible DSLs by providing code gen-
erators that successively lower higher-level abstractions to
lower-level abstractions, and, ultimately, to executable code.
Importantly, staging allows optimization to be performed at
every level of the lowering process. Hence, some optimiza-
tions can be performed at high levels of abstraction (e.g., op-
timization on plaintext computations (Section 5), while other
optimizations can be performed at lower levels of abstrac-
tion. As a result, abstraction penalties are minimized. Another
benefit to staging is that because the translation is written in
terms of generators, it is simple to add new abstractions at
any given level.
4.1 Staged Compilation
Multi-Stage Programming (or staging) is the programming
language technique that executes programs in multiple stages.
In Lightweight Modular Staging (LMS), higher order type
(Rep[T]) labels the program fragments of the next stage. In
the current stage, all Rep-typed variables (and computations)
form computation graphs (i.e., LMS IR). Staging is similar to
and more general than the construction of TensorFlow com-
putation graphs using TensorFlow APIs, since it is designed
to handle more programming language constructs such as
functions and closures. The key benefit of staging is that the
present-stage code can be written in a high-level style, yet
generates future-stage code that is very low-level and effi-
cient. Figure 2 illustrates an end-to-end compilation path in
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HACCLE. The compiler takes a Scala program with Harpoon
annotations, constructs a computation graph that expresses an
abstract circuit. Given a backend specification, the compiler
will generate a target program for it. Currently, our compiler
is not able to automatically choose an appropriate backend
and initialize all the parameters that are needed for it. Thus, a
backend specification is needed. It is a file that contains a set
of parameters that are needed for translating an abstract circuit
to a concrete backend program. For testing and development,
we currently hard-coded those information in the program.
There are no technique difficulties to read the information
from a file.
Harpoon
+
Scala
Staged
Computation
Graph
Backend
Program
Transform Transform
LMS
Backend Specification
Figure 2: Compilation in HACCLE
Generative Programming and Lightweight Modular
Staging (LMS) As mentioned previously, the HACCLE
compiler uses LMS for code generation due to its multi-
staging capabilities. In LMS, a special type constructor
Rep[T] is used to denote a staged expression, which will
cause an expression of type T to become part of the generated
program. For example, the expression Rep[SNum] denotes an
encrypted integer. Given two Rep[SNum] values a and b, eval-
uating the expression a + b will generate code for a given
backend. For the Helib backend, the generated code will be
Ctxt r = a; r += b;, where Ctxt is the type of a cipher
text in the Helib library. For the TFHE backend, the generated
code will be:
LweSample* x5 =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(64, x2->params);
fhe_add(x5, a, b, 64, bk);
where LweSample is the type of a cipher text in the TFHE
library. As a TFHE program denotes a Boolean circuit, it
does not provide arithmetic expressions and operations. The
compiler expresses an integer as a bit-array of size 64. The
function fhe_add is part of our HACCLE library of the TFHE
library.
4.2 Harpoon
HAccle Rich Representation for Program OperatiON (Har-
poon) language is an expressive subset of Scala for writing
MPC programs. It is an imperative and monomorphic lan-
guage, featuring standard control flow operations: loops, func-
tion calls, conditionals, and recursion. The language is de-
signed to be expressive enough that programmers could easily
write Harpoon code directly, while being constrained enough
to ensure that Harpoon programs can be implemented via
translation to secure low-level computations. In practice, Har-
poon serves as the top-level IR for the HACCLE pipeline, and
is the language for end-user programs.
Harpoon language is not only able to access all the Scala li-
braries, but also provides a set of cryptographic data structures.
For example, HArray[T] is an encrypted array that allows
one to index on cipher texts. It also provides a set of security
annotations that are forms of syntactic metadata added to the
Scala source code. Annotations are read via reflection and are
used to direct code generation. They are agnostic to the target
backend, and are used by subsequent stages of the HACCLE
pipeline.
For example, the annotation sec is used to mark the
provider (also the owner) of the private data. Recursive func-
tions and loops may be annotated with an expression, placing
an upper bound on the number of recursive calls and iterations.
This expression can reference the parameters of the function,
allowing this bound to vary according to the context in which
a function is called. As an example, consider the signature of
merge function:
@bound(a.length + b.length)
def merge(a: HArray[Int], b: HArray[Int]): Harray[Int]
The upper bound on the number of recursive calls is the sum
of the length of the two input arrays. Note that the semantics
of function calls in Harpoon is not impacted by this bound;
rather it is used by subsequent stages of the pipeline to bound
the invocation of a recursive function call. See Section 4.4 for
details.
The annotated program is also equipped with a type system
which ensures that information about private data cannot be
leaked; this provides the first-layer guarantees that the pro-
grams can be successfully compiled by the later stages of
the pipeline. Consider the statement println(a), where a
is annotated as private data. The compiler will report a type
error, as encrypted data is not understandable or meaningful
to users. But the assignment @sec(alice) val r = a will
not cause a type error, because the annotation indicates that
the variable r stores encrypted data. While the type system
at this stage does not make use of fine-grained ownership
information, this information will be passed down through
the pipeline.
4.3 Intermediate Representation
HACCLE intermediate representation (HIR) serves as an in-
terface between high-level programming language and cryp-
tographic backends. HIR is a domain-specific intermediate
language, and gains benefits from LMS to support towers
of abstractions. It encompasses all the primitive operations
which we have supported so far, e.g., encryption, decryption,
sharing, and combining.
Multi-level IR Different backends may support different
sets of operations in HIR—no backend is “complete” in that
there is a direct implementation of each HIR operation in that
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backend. For example, the TFHE backend provides a com-
plete set of logical operations, but does not support arithmetic
operations. In contrast, other backends may support arithmetic
operations but not Boolean operations. The compiler’s job is
to rewrite HIR circuits to be compatible with backends.
As shown in Figure 3, HIR is a multi-level IR. The compiler
can thus use rewrites to target the subset of operations that a
given backend supports. For example, arithmetic operations
(adds, multiplies) can be rewritten into bit-level implemen-
tations (as, e.g., ripple-carry adders, or bit-level implementa-
tions), or Boolean operations can be represented as arithmetic
operations that happen to operate over Z2. We are developing
a set of these rewrite rules for our various backends (and,
indeed, rely on exactly this type of rewrite to support floating
point operations).
A key task for integrating a new backend is identifying what
set of HIR operations that module supports, hence directing
the compiler to perform appropriate rewrites. Notably, if the
compiler cannot rewrite an HIR circuit to target the set of
operations a backend supports, this will manifest as a type
error, providing feedback to the user.
Float, FloatArray
UNum, UNumArray Num, NumArray
Bit, BitArray
Figure 3: Example of multi-level HIRs
For example, in the scenario of using a FHE scheme, an
integer is represented by a Num node in HIR shown below,
where the field provider is an abstraction of the party who
provides the value, and the field value is an abstraction of
the encrypted value.
case class Num(
val provider: Set[Rep[SOwner]], // who provides it
val value: Rep[SNum] // encrypted value
)
In this case, a variable declaration statement in Harpoon, i.e.,
@sec(alic) val x = 5;, is transformed to val o = new
Owner(alice); val x = Num(o, 5); in HIR.
In the scenario of using a secret sharing scheme, an integer
is represented by a ShareNum node in HIR shown below. It
describes a general secret sharing protocol. The provider is
the one who contributes the value that are shared among a
set of players with threshold. And the set of observers
are allowed to access the value once it gets combined.
case class ShareNum(
val provider: Set[Rep[SOwner]], // who provides it
val players: Set[Rep[SOwner]], // players
val observers: Set[Rep[SOwner]], // who observes it
val threshold: Int, // threshold
val value: Rep[SShareNum] // shares
)
In addition, the HIR provides libraries for implementing
secure computations. Those libraries are not supported in
general-purpose compilers, but are essential to build inter-
esting multi-party applications with security guarantees. For
example, the HIR provides array indexing on cipher texts. Let
us assume that arr is an HIR array. The following lists its
operations:
• arr(i) - array index, where i is either a plaintext or a
cipher text.
• arr.update(i, v) - update the ith element with the value
v, where i is either a plaintext or a cipher text.
• arr.slice(i, j) - array slicing from the ith element until
the jthe element, where i and j are plaintext.
• arr.length - the length of the array
The way these array operations with secure indices are
currently implemented is through, essentially, a naive ORAM:
to index into an array with a cipher text index, the compiler
will generate a circuit that accesses every array element, then
uses a secure selector (multiplexer) to output the desired array
element. This is equivalent to a set of if-then-elses to choose
the desired array element, except with log depth instead of
linear depth. Writing to an array element with a cipher text
index is the equivalent of an array copy, where each element
of the new array performs a check for whether the old element
of the array should be copied, or the “update” value should
be copied.
As implementation details of cryptographic backends are
abstracted away from the HIR, our framework can be easily
extended to support more advanced cryptographic backends,
for example, a backend with oblivious RAM (ORAM). Here,
we would leverage HIR’s ability to provide backend-specific
rewrite rules, and would directly rewrite array operations to
ORAM operations
Type system. HIR also abstracts away the implementation
details of cryptographic primitives and protocols. For exam-
ple, an addition operation does not specify how a secure ad-
dition is achieved as different protocols perform in different
ways. But the type rules provide an approximation of data
access policy that specifies how data is provided, accessed,
and shared. For example, an addition operation on two shared
numbers is only allowed on the same set of players with the
same threshold. And the result is provided by either one of
its operand’s providers with the same set of players with the
same threshold, and is allowed to be accessed by either of one
the operands’ observers.
def +(x: ShareNum, y: ShareNum) = {
assert(x.players.equals(y.players))
assert(x.threshold == y.threshold)
ShareNum(x.provider | y.provider, players,
x.observers | y.observers, threshold, value.+(y.value))
}
Given a cryptographic backend, HIR is further rewritten to
a program with the corresponding cryptographic semantics.
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And the HIR type system is refined to provide more precise
information on data access policy. For example, the type rule
of the addition operation is refined to the following when
using the additive secret sharing scheme.
def +(x: ShareNum, y: ShareNum) = {
assert(x.players.equals(y.players))
assert(x.players.size == x.threshold)
assert(x.threshold == y.threshold)
ShareNum(x.provider | y.provider, players,
x.observers & y.observers, threshold, value.+(y.value))
}
The type rule checks it is a n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme,
i.e., x.players.size == x.threshold. This type rule pro-
vides a stronger security guarantee. The refined type system
guarantees that the generated HIR program complies with
the semantics of the backend. For example, an FHE target
program is not transformed into a program that may invoke
secret sharing primitives.
4.4 Obliviousness
In addition to bridging the semantic gap between a high and
a low-level language, our compiler also bridges the semantic
gap of obliviousness. Boolean circuits and Arithmetic circuits
are oblivious in the sense that they perform the same sequence
of operations independently of the input. A program without
privacy concern change their flow of control according to
the input: they execute statements conditionally, loop for a
variable number of steps, etc. The following transformations
may seem quite inefficient at first sight, but they are absolutely
required in order to maintain obliviousness.
Encrypted Array Indexing Indexing an array with a ci-
pher text translates to a multiplexer circuit which takes every
element of the array as an input and outputs the element in
the position that matches the indexing cipher text. This multi-
plexer circuit consists integer comparators and selectors.
Conditional Execution After a type-checked Harpoon pro-
gram is translated to the program written in HIR, there are
two types of if-constructs allowed. One is the standard if-
statement where its condition depends on plaintext compar-
ison, and the two branches consist of a sequence of state-
ments that may have side effects. The other has the form z
= if(b){x}else{y}, where the value of b is the result of
private comparisons. Obliviousness is effectively guaranteed
by executing both the consequent and alternative branches. If
the backend is a Boolean circuit, this if-construct is further
implemented as a selector. If the backend is an arithmetic cir-
cuit, the program is transformed to z = b * x + (1 - b)
* y.
Consider the following Harpoon code snippet. The variable
arr stores a sequence of shared numbers, the comparison
result of max < arr(i) is a shared number as well. So the
program
if (max < arr(i)) { max = arr(i) }
is transformed to
val b = max < arr(i)
max = b * arr(i) + (1 - b) * max
Note that such a program transformation is non-trivial for a
program allowing shared mutable states, due to the complex-
ity of identifying potential side effects for the two branches.
Currently, an if-statement will be transformed if the side ef-
fects of its two branches can be syntactically detected.
Loops and Recursion All function calls are treated as
macros and simply inlined where they are called. All loops are
simply unfolded as the number of iterations is a compile-time
constant). Figure 4 demonstrates our treatment for recursive
calls, where the obliviousness is achieved by using the extra
plaintext parameter d in the right side of the figure. In this
transformed program, the value d is initialized by the Harpoon
annotation and decreases with each iteration. That makes sure
the recursive calls only iterates d times.
4.5 Code Generation
Cryptographic Backends In the context of building cir-
cuits, LMS is used to specialized a circuit with respect to a
target backend. The outcome of such a programmatic special-
ization is a compiled target of the circuit.
The code generator transforms an abstract circuit into a
concrete one for a given backend. For example, the following
adder expressed by HIR is specialized to the Boolean circuit
shown in Figure 12 and arithmetic circuit shown in Figure 13
in the Appendix 9.
val o1 = Owner();
output((Num(o1, 10).+(Num(o1, 5))).eval(o1))
The essence of multi-stage programming is to generate effi-
cient programs using high-level constructs without runtime
penalty [37]. The example in Figure 5 a shows a code snippet
that generates a for loop. Note that the if condition is com-
posed of a plaintext Boolean type, so this code is executed at
code generation time as shown Figure 5 b.
Resource Estimation Resource Estimation acts as another
backend for the compiler, which generates a graphical repre-
sentation of the HIR nodes circuit and feeds it to a generic
"Evaluator" that walks the graph and accumulates some in-
formation at each node. The estimator is parameterized on
the given resource model, which is an assignment of costs to
each node and edge type in the graph, as well as a depth of
each edge.
At the most basic level, the resource estimation framework
expects an enumeration of the abstract "gates" for the particu-
lar cost model, as well as a description of how each HIR node
type affects these gates and depths. The gates are what the
total cost is tallied in terms of. As an example, a cost model
for one of the secret sharing backends might have round com-
plexity and communication complexity as gates, whereas a
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Scala Program
val a = 5;
val b = 15;
def gcd(x: Int, y: Int)
: Int = {
if (x == 0) y
else gcd(y % x, x)
}
println(gcd(a, b))
Harpoon Program
@sec(alice) val a = 5;
@sec(alice) val b = 15;
@bound(5)
def gcd(x: Int @sec, y: Int @sec)
: Int @sec = {
if (x == 0) y
else gcd(y % x, x)
}
@reveal(alice) val r = gcd(a, b)
println(r)
HIR Program
val o = Owner(alice)
val a = Num(o, 5);
val b = Num(o, 15);
topFun gcd(d: Rep[Int], x: Rep[SNum], y: Rep[SNum])
: Rep[SNum] = {
if (d == 0) y
else
if (x == 0) gcd(d-1, x, y)
else gcd(d - 1, y % x, x)
}
val r = Num(o, gcd(5, a.value, b.value)).eval(o)
println(r)
Figure 4: An example: Computing the Greatest Common Divisor(GCD) of two numbers. The one on the left is the Scala textbook implementation. The one in
the middle is the Harpoon program. The annotations mean that a user, alice, owns the data a and b, and wants to compute the GCD of them. A different party
receives and stores the data in an encrypted form, performs computation on the encrypted data, and provides the encrypted results to alice. Note that the bound
annotation indicates maximum number of times the function gets called. The one on right is the HIR program translated from the Harpoon program in the middle.
The translated gcd function has one extra parameter d initialized by 5, and decreases with each iteration.
(a) HIR code example:
val sum = topFun((x: Rep[SNumArray], len: Rep[Int]) => {
var n = 0;
val b = true
var res = Num(o1, 0).value
while (n < len) {
if (b) {
res = res + x(n)
}
n += 1
}
res
})
(b) Generated C code of TFHE backend:
const LweSample* x3(const LweSample* x4, int x5){
int x6 = 0;
const LweSample* x7 = num_init(0, 64 ,x2);
while (x6 < x5) {
x7 = add(x7, array_index(x4, x6, 64, x0), 64, x0);
x6 = x6 + 1;
}
return x7;
}
Figure 5: (a) HIR code example. (b) Generated C code of TFHE backend.
circuit backend might literally have AND, OR, and NOT as
its gates. The evaluator then walks the HIR graph and accu-
mulates the abstract gate costs produced by each node, and
tracks the maximum total depth encountered for critical path
estimation. In the case of a secret sharing scheme, walking
the graph will (potentially) increment round and communica-
tion complexity as new computation nodes are encountered,
whereas a circuit backend will increment gate costs. These
gate costs are then instantiated with specific costs (in terms
of lower-level operations) based on the resource estimates
determined by the cryptographic experts.
This framework can also be easily extended to evaluate
costs that do not follow this simple model. All that is needed
is a definition for some data structure to be accumulated at
each HIR node (by default, this consists of a mapping from
gate type to gate count and an integer for current depth), and
a transfer function for how each node type accumulates into
this structure.
Each cost model can also be parameterized on some values
which are configurable but known at compile time (such as
integer bitwidth), the prime modulus which can be determined
from the security specifications, and specific edge costs.
The ability to estimate the cost of a program in multiple
backends is useful when selecting a target, as well. Programs
are sometimes inherently better suited to execution in one
protocol instead of another. If the cost for these two protocols
are comparable (e.g. both models measure “communication
complexity”), then we can generate a resource estimate for
the program in each available backend to determine which
backend would be best suited for execution.
5 Optimization
Our compiler contains a sequence of optimization transfor-
mations. For example, the peephole optimization, e.g., x &&
true is optimized to just x; common subexpression elim-
ination (CSE), e.g., x = a + b; y = (a + b) * c is op-
timized to x = a + b; y = x * c; constant folding, and
dead code elimination (DCE). In addition to those optimiza-
tions that a general purpose compiler has, we identify sev-
eral optimizations involving encrypted values. Given an in-
memory representation of a Boolean circuit or an arithmetic
circuit, the goal of the optimization is to reduce the depth of
the circuit and the number of costly gates.
5.1 Scalar Multiplication
The multiplicative depth of circuits is the main practical limi-
tation in performing computations over encrypted data. We
identify the opportunity when one of the operands of a mul-
tiplication is plain text. For example, the multiplication is
eliminated if the plain text is 0 or 1. Moreover, consider the
case of calculating pow(x,n), where x is an encrypted data.
The compiler divides the computation into subproblems of
size n/2 and call the subproblems recursively. Figure 6 shows
the program of computing pow(2,8), where 2 is private. The
Harpoon program is transformed to its corresponding HIR
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program, and is generated to the TFHE program, where the
function unum_mul multiplies two 64-bit encrypted integers.
Our generate program only needs O(logn) multiplies. Al-
though this optimization is simple, but, as you can see from
this example, has a dramatic impact on performance.
Harpoon Program:
@sec ( a l i c e ) val a = 2;
sca la . math .pow(2 , 8 ) ;
HIR Program:
val o1 = Owner ( ) ;
UNum(o1 , 2 ) .pow(8)
Generated TFHE program:
const LweSample* x3 = unum_init(2, 64, x2);
LweSample* x4 = unum_mul(x3, x3, 64, x0);
LweSample* x5 = unum_mul(x4, x4, 64, x0);
return unum_mul(x5, x5, 64, x0);
Figure 6: Example of computing pow(2,8), where 2 is private.
The effect of the optimization is clearly demonstrated in
Figure 7, which shows the graphs of the generated circuits
after and before optimization respectively. The left is a depth-
3 circuit, and contains three multiply gates. The right is a
depth-7 circuit, and contains 7 multiply gates.
The generated graphs show an abstract model of execu-
tion cost where each operation is treated as atomic; How-
ever, the resource estimation framework can be specialized to
particular backends by providing the corresponding models
of execution cost (in terms of communication complexity,
number of logic gates, etc.) These backend-specific resource
estimates can be used to compare different optimization strate-
gies and intelligently select the appropriate one based on the
execution semantics of the targeted backend. As mentioned
in Section 4.5, in addition to selecting the right set of opti-
mizations to use, these specialized estimates even let us pick
the most optimal backend to target.
5.2 Private Comparisons
The private comparison is a major bottleneck in MPC pro-
tocols due to their inherent non-arithmetic structure [11]. It
privately determines whether a < b, where a and b are con-
sidered as private information. Operators involve private com-
parisons include <, <=, >, >=, == and !=. One operator may be
encoded by two or more other operators, e.g., a != b is equiv-
alent to a > b || a < b. However, the two expressions may
have different costs. We identify some implementation heuris-
tics that help us generate efficient programs.
We take the HoneyBadgerMPC library as an example
to demonstrate our implementation technique. HoneyBad-
gerMPC provides two comparison protocols: LessThan and
Equality. As their names indicated, they allow us to evaluate
a < b and a == b on shared values. The result is 1 if it is
true, otherwise is 0. What’s more, the result is also secret
shared due to the fact that the result of comparison leaks in-
formation about input. Building an MPC compiler requires
us to implement other operators in terms of these two. Taking
x0: Number(64, 2) (13)
x1: Multiply(x0, x0) (16)
x2: Multiply(x1, x0) (16)
x3: Multiply(x2, x0) (16)
x4: Multiply(x3, x0) (16)
x5: Multiply(x4, x0) (16)
x6: Multiply(x5, x0) (16)
x7: Multiply(x6, x0) (16)
x0: Number(64, 2) (13)
x1: Multiply(x0, x0) (16)
x2: Multiply(x1, x1) (16)
x3: Multiply(x2, x2) (16)
Figure 7: Graphs of computing pow(2,8): before (left) and after applying
optimizations (right).
Encoding a >= b Execution Time
(b < a) + (a == b) 0.23s
1 - (b < a) 0.10s
Table 1: Execution time of evaluating a >= b for 100 times, where a and b
are randomly generated number ranging from 1 to 100.
the operator >= as an example. A naive and intuitive imple-
mentation is encoding a >= b as (b < a) + (a == b). An
alternative implementation is encoding a >= b as 1 - (b <
a). Our abstract resource estimator will generate one LEQ
gate, one ADD gate and one EQUAL gate for the first imple-
mentation, and one SUB gate and LEQ gate for the second
implementation. As mentioned in Section 4.5, each backend
has its own resource model. In the HoneyBadgerMPC re-
source model, the costs of addition and subtraction are trivial
since they require no communication, and the multiplication
takes one rounds and one multicast to finish. When it comes
to comparison, the round complexity of comparison is seven
times more than the cost of multiplication [32], the communi-
cation cost is even more expensive. Also, the cost of equality
check is higher than less than operation. Thus, we believe the
second implementation is optimal due to the reduced number
of comparisons. This is how we experiment with optimized
implementations with the help of our resource estimators.
To verify the above observation, we perform a set of private
comparisons in a HoneyBadgerMPC program (on a single
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS machine of 16 GB RAM with 8 Intel Core
i7 Processors). Our tests execute 100 times of the greater
or equal comparisons on two randomly generated numbers.
Table 1 compares the running time of the two encoding.
6 Evaluation
We have implemented our HACCLE framework in Scala. To
assess our framework, we present three experiments. The first
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focuses on Harpoon and HIR programming languages; the
second focuses on the optimization of scalar multiplications;
the third focuses on our support of indexing to arrays at secret
indices. For simplicity, the test program uses plaintext values
instead of obtaining them at runtime. We conducted our ex-
periments on a single Ubuntu 18.04 LTS machine of 16 GB
RAM with 8 Intel Core i7 Processors.
6.1 Case Study 1: Secure Auctions
Recall the discussion of the practical importance of secure
auctions in Section 2. In this experiment, we implement a
second-price auction that is designed to give bidders confi-
dence to bid their best price without overpaying. In a second-
price auction, bidders submit sealed bids. The bidder who
submits the highest bid is awarded the object and pays the
amount of the second-highest bid.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the code snippets written in
Harpoon and HIR respectively, where the elements in array
bidders denote bidder’s identities, and the elements in array
bid denote their bids. The implementation uses four variables
(fst, snd, ifst and isnd) to store the values of the first and
second highest bids and their holders respectively. As you can
see from Figure 8, writing the Harpoon implementation does
not need developers to have security concerns, or to have the
mindset of building circuits. Programmers can program func-
tionally or imperatively, thanks to the expressivity of Scala.
The HIR implementation in Figure 9 may look more tedious
but exposes some nature of building secure computations (cir-
cuits). For example, the use of those if-constructs reminds
advanced users that they are using selectors. This allows ad-
vanced users to experiment with advanced optimizations that
may not be achieved by automatic program transformations.
As a key example, observe that the linear sequence of oper-
ations in Figures 8 and 9 will result in a suboptimal circuit.
However, rewriting the HIR code in Figure 9 in a functional
style as (bids zip bidders).map(..).reduce(..) al-
lows us to abstract over the reduction pattern and substitute
the linear sequence with a tree reduction pattern that yields a
circuit of logarithmic depth that allows efficient parallel com-
putation. Using known techniques for extracting functional
dependencies from imperative loops [16, 33], this transfor-
mation could be automated and applied automatically to for
loops in Harpoon.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the generated SPDZ and
HoneyBadgerMPC program respectively. As the loops are
unrolled during code generation, we only show the gener-
ated program for 3 bidders. For simplicity, the program uses
plaintext values as input instead of obtaining them at runtime.
For testing and development, the HoneyBadgerMPC program
runs in a single-process simulated network. It contains lines
of code dealing with network connections and synchroniza-
tions. Those are concerns that Harpoon and HIR developers
do not have to worry about.
var ifst = bidders(0)
var isnd = bidders(0)
var fst = bids(0)
var snd = bids(0)
if (bids(0) < bids(1)) {
ifst = bidders(1)
fst = bids(1)
} else {
isnd = bidders(1)
snd = bids(1)
}
for (i <- 2 until bids.length) {
if (fst < bids(i)) {
isnd = ifst
snd = fst
ifst = bidders(i)
fst = bids(i)
} else if (snd < bids(i)) {
isnd = bidders(i)
snd = bids(i)
}
}
(ifst, snd)
Figure 8: Harpoon code snippet performing a second-price auction, where
bidders and bids are stored in an array of private values.
var ifst = bidders(0)
var isnd = bidders(0)
var fst = bids(0)
var snd = bids(0)
val b = bids(0) < bids(1)
ifst = if (b) bidder(1) else ifst
fst = if (b) bids(1) else fst
isnd = if (b) isnd else bidders(1)
snd = if (b) snd else bids(1)
for(i <- 2 until bids.length){
val b0 = fst < bids(i)
val b1 = snd < bids(i)
isnd = if (b0) ifst else if (b1) bidders(i) else isnd
snd = if (b0) fst else if (b1) bids(i) else snd
ifst = if (b0) bidders(i) else ifst
fst = if (b0) bids(i) else fst
}
(ist, snd)
Figure 9: HIR code snippet performing a second-price auction, where
bidders and bids are stored in an array of private values.
6.2 Case Study 2: Matrix-Vector Product
This experiment performs a set of secure matrix-vector mul-
tiplication, where one party (the client) has an input matrix,
and the other party (the server) has a vector. Figure 10 shows
our test program that randomly generates a 10 ∗N matrix
(where N is range from 100 to 500), and multiplies with a
fixed vector [1,399,1,413,1,587,1,354,1,444]. The goal is
to show the effectiveness of our optimization discussed in
Section 5.1. The HElib library serves as our testing backend
that implements the BGV homomorphic encryption scheme
and effectively uses the Smart-Vercauteren cipher text pack-
ing techniques [34]. Table 2 compares the running time of the
generated HElib programs with and without optimizations.
As N increases from 100 to 500, the speedup become more
observable.
As our compiler unrolls all the loops, the size of the gen-
erated code is not small. Figure 16 shows the generated HE-
lib program that computes computes matrix-vector multipli-
cation of Array(Array(1, 2, 3), Array(4, 5, 6)) and
Array(1, 2, 1).
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val rand = new scala.util.Random
val start = 1000
@sec(alice) val m = Array.fill(N)(
Array.fill(10)(start + rand.nextInt(start + 1)))
val v = Array(1, 399, 1, 413, 1, 587, 1, 354, 1, 444)
m * v
Figure 10: Test of Matrix-Vector Multiplications
N 100 200 300 400 500
before 7.64s 20.69s 57.79s 140s 296s
after 6.48s 15.21s 35.83s 82s 164s
Table 2: Execution time of the HElib programs that perform multiplications
of a matrix of 10∗N and a vector [1,399,1,413,1,587,1,354,1,444] before
and after the optimization.
6.3 Case Study 3: Merge Sort
This experiment implements MergeSort in HIR. It is inter-
esting as the implementation involves array indexing and
conditional executions, and an array lookup on a private index
is not supported by most languages [20]. The implementa-
tion is written in HIR, not in Harpoon, as HIR exposes the
language features needed in writing secure computations.
MergeSort is a divide and conquer algorithm. It recursively
divides an input array into two halves and then merges the
two sorted halves. Our implementation is shown in Figure 11.
In the function mergesort, the variable r (at line 31) stores a
recursion object initialized with the bound 10. The expression
r.rec (at line 32) is the construct for defining a bounded
recursive function call. This allows one to explicitly specify
the bound of the defining recursive function. The NumArray
is the type for arrays that allow private indexing. The two
parameters i and j are plaintext, which is important for un-
rolling the recursive function at compile time. The function
slice(i, j) returns a subarray from the ith element until
the jth element, where i and j are plaintext integers. The if-
statement at lines 35 to 40 is the standard one as its condition
depends on a plain text value. The function merge is used for
merging two halves. All the if-constructs appearing in this
function are oblivious as their conditions depend on cipher
text values. The loop at line 12 is bounded as the length of
an array is known at compile time. Figure 18, Figure 19 and
Figure 20 show the generated TFHE program, where loops
and recursions are all unrolled.
7 Related Work
There have been many MPC frameworks proposed in recent
years and several of them are already integrated into HACCLE.
We list the prominent MPC frameworks as follows.
SCALE-MAMBA [24] is an existing MPC framework that
is closest to HACCLE. We utilize it as one of our crypto-
graphic backends to implement secret sharing based protocols
and FHE based protocols. It is a combination of a compiler
and a runtime environment where optimizations can be per-
formed at lower level. Compared with SCALE-MAMBA,
1 val o1 = Owner()
2 // input
3 var = NumArray(o1, 3, 1, 5, 2)
4 val s = 0
5 val e = arr.length
6 // merge
7 def merge(o: Owner, arr1: NumArray, arr2: NumArray) = {
8 var res = NewNumArray(o, arr1.length + arr2.length)
9 var i = Num(o, 0)
10 var j = Num(o, 0)
11 var k = 0
12 while (k < res.length) {
13 val b1 = i < Num(o, arr1.length)
14 val b2 = j < Num(o, arr2.length)
15 val p = if (b1.not) arr2(j) else if (b2.not) arr1(i)
16 else if (arr1(i) <= arr2(j)) arr1(i) else arr2(j)
17 res = res.update(k, p)
18 // updating arr1 index
19 i = if (b1.not) i else if (b2.not) i + Num(o, 1) else
20 if (p == arr1(i)) i + Num(o, 1) else i
21
22 // updating arr2 index
23 j = if (b1.not) j + Num(o, 1) else if (b2.not) j
24 else if (p == arr2(j)) j + Num(o, 1) else j
25
26 k = k + 1
27 }
28 res
29 }
30 val r = recFuel(10)
31 val mergesort = r.rec[NumArray, Owner, Int, Int] {
32 f => (a, o, i, j) => {
33 val mid = (j - i) / 2
34 if (mid == 0 || i >= j){ a }
35 else {
36 val left = a.slice(i, mid)
37 val right = a.slice(mid, j)
38 merge(o, f(left, o, 0, left.length),
39 f(right, o, 0, right.length))
40 }
41 }
42 }
43 val res = mergesort(arr, o1, s, e)
44 output(res.eval(o1))
Figure 11: MergeSort implemented in HIR
HACCLE also provides a resource estimation framework and
focuses more on optimization at higher level.
HoneybadgerMPC [27] is another MPC backend of HAC-
CLE that supports secret-sharing based protocols. The unique-
ness of HoneybadgerMPC is the combination of a robust on-
line phase and an optimistic non-robust offline phase. It pro-
vides fairness guarantees even in the asynchronous network
setting and also preserves efficiency to make MPC programs
practical to run.
As privacy preserving machine learning becomes more
and more popular, many frameworks have been developed
specifically for this use case, such as ABY [14], ABY3 [29],
CHET [13], EzPC [7], CrypTFlow [25] and secureNN [39].
These frameworks are highly optimized for machine learn-
ing and are designed for the two-party setting or three-party
setting. We choose not to include them due to our desire to
support an arbitrary number of parties.
There are also many other MPC frameworks such as Viff
[2], Jiff [30], MPyC [3] and PICCO [45]. Theoretically HAC-
CLE can embed any framework as a backend so while we
have not integrated all of these at this time, they should all fit
into HACCLE if desired in the future.
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8 Conclusion
Secure MPC-based applications play crucial role in solving
many important practical problems such as high-valued pro-
curements. But building performant MPC-based applications
from scratch is a notoriously difficult task as it requires ex-
pertise ranging from cryptography to circuit optimization.
Therefore software developers need an ecosystem for build-
ing MPC-based applications. As a solution to this problem,
we have introduced the HACCLE toolchain, a multi-stage
compiler for optimized circuit generation. We believe that the
HACCLE toolchain offers a compelling approach to the de-
sign and implementation of secure MPC-based applications.
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9 Appendix
void TFHE_Addition(TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* x0,
TFheGateBootstrappingParameterSet* x1){
TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* x2 =
new_random_gate_bootstrapping_secret_keyset(x1);
x0 = &x2->cloud;
LweSample* x3 =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(64, x2->params);
for(uint64_t i = 0; i < 64; i ++) {
bootsSymEncrypt(&x3[i], ((uint64_t) value>>i)&10, x2);
}
LweSample* x4 =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(64, x2->params);
for(uint64_t i = 0; i < 64; i ++) {
bootsSymEncrypt(&x4[i], ((uint64_t) value>>i)&5, x2);
}
LweSample* x5 =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(64, x2->params);
fhe_add(x5, a, b, 64, bk);
printf("%ld\n", num_eval(x5, 64, x2));
}
Figure 12: Generated the TFHE program that perforom a secure addition
of two 64-bit integers (10 and 5). For simplicity, the program uses plaintext
values as input instead of obtaining them at runtime.
/************* Functions **************/
static inline Plaintext num_eval(CryptoContext<Poly> cc,
const LPPrivateKey<Poly> pk,
const Ciphertext<Poly> value) {
Plaintext ret;
cc->Decrypt(pk, value, &ret);
return ret;
}
/**************** BGV_Addition ****************/
void BGV_Addition(CryptoContext<Poly> x0){
LPKeyPair<Poly> x2 = x0->KeyGen();
x0->EvalMultKeyGen(x2.secretKey);
cout << num_eval(x0, x2.secretKey,
x0->EvalAdd(x0->Encrypt(x2.publicKey,
x0->MakeFractionalPlaintext(10)),
x0->Encrypt(x2.publicKey, x0->MakeFractionalPlaintext(5))
)) << endl;
}
Figure 13: Generated the HElib program that perforom a secure addition of
two integers (10 and 5). For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as
input instead of obtaining them at runtime.
def auction():
x0 = sint(15) # owned by 2
x1 = sint(12) # owned by 0
x2 = sint(20) # owned by 1
x3 = x1<x2 # owned by 0 1
x4 = x3 * x1 + (1 - x3) * x2 # owned by 0 1
x5 = x0<x4 # owned by 0 1 2
x6 = x5 * x4 + (1 - x5) * x0 # owned by 0 1 2
x6.reveal_to(0)
x6.reveal_to(1)
x6.reveal_to(2) # owned by
x10 = sint(2) # owned by 2
x7 = sint(1) # owned by 1
x8 = sint(0) # owned by 0
x9 = x3 * x7 + (1 - x3) * x8 # owned by 0 1
x11 = x5 * x9 + (1 - x5) * x10 # owned by 0 1 2
x11.reveal_to(0)
x11.reveal_to(1)
x11.reveal_to(2)
Figure 14: Generate SPDZ program that computes a second-price auction.
For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of obtaining
them at runtime. There are three bids (15, 12 and 20) whose holders are
denoted as 0, 1 and 2 respectively.
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from honeybadgermpc.progs.mixins.share_comparison
import Equality, LessThan
from honeybadgermpc.preprocessing import
(PreProcessedElements as FakePreProcessedElements,)
from honeybadgermpc.progs.mixins.share_arithmetic import
(BeaverMultiply, BeaverMultiplyArrays, MixinConstants, )
import logging
import sys
import asyncio
from time import time
mpc_config = {
MixinConstants.MultiplyShareArray: BeaverMultiplyArrays(),
MixinConstants.MultiplyShare: BeaverMultiply(),
MixinConstants.ShareLessThan: LessThan(),}
async def Auction(x0): # x0: an MPC context
x2 = x0.ShareFuture()
x2.ret.set_result(Share(12))
x3 = x0.ShareFuture()
x3.ret.set_result(Share(20))
x4 = x0.ShareFuture()
x4.ret.set_result(Share(15))
x5 = (x2 < x3)
x6 = x5 * x2 + (1 - x5) * x3
x7 = (x4 < x6)
print(await (x7 * x6 + (1 - x7) * x4).open())
print(await (x7 * (x5 * num(x0,1) + (1 - x5) * num(x0,0))
+ (1 - x7) * num(x0,2)).open())
async def _run(peers, n, t, my_id, k):
from honeybadgermpc.ipc import ProcessProgramRunner
async with ProcessProgramRunner(
peers, n, t, my_id, mpc_config) as runner:
await runner.execute("0", Auction)
bytes_sent = runner.node_communicator.bytes_sent
print(f"[my_id] Total bytes sent out: bytes_sent")
if __name__ == "__main__":
from honeybadgermpc.config import HbmpcConfig
import sys
HbmpcConfig.load_config()
asyncio.set_event_loop(asyncio.new_event_loop())
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
loop.set_debug(False)
try:
pp_elements = FakePreProcessedElements()
k = 3
if HbmpcConfig.my_id == 0:
num_bits = 40
pp_elements.generate_triples(num_bits * 20 * k,
HbmpcConfig.N, HbmpcConfig.t)
pp_elements.generate_share_bits(num_bits * k,
HbmpcConfig.N, HbmpcConfig.t)
pp_elements.preprocessing_done()
else:
loop.run_until_complete(
pp_elements.wait_for_preprocessing())
loop.run_until_complete(
_run(HbmpcConfig.peers, HbmpcConfig.N,
HbmpcConfig.t, HbmpcConfig.my_id, k)
)
finally:
loop.close()
Figure 15: Generate HoneyBadgerMPC that computes a second-price auc-
tion. For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of
obtaining them at runtime. There are three bids (15, 12 and 20) whose hold-
ers are denoted as 0, 1 and 2 respectively. For testing and development, the
HoneyBadgerMPC program runs in a single-process simulated network.
#include <helib/FHE.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
using namespace std;
/************* Functions **************/
static inline NTL::ZZX unum_eval(Ctxt n,
FHESecKey secretKey) {
NTL::ZZX ret;
secretKey.Decrypt(ret, n);
return ret;
}
static inline Ctxt unum_add(Ctxt n1, Ctxt n2) {
Ctxt ret = n1;
ret += n2;
return ret;
}
static inline Ctxt unum_init(int value,
const FHEPubKey& publicKey) {
Ctxt ret(publicKey);
publicKey.Encrypt(ret, NTL::to_ZZX(value));
return ret;
}
static inline Ctxt unum_mul_plain(Ctxt n1, int n2) {
Ctxt ret = n1;
ret.multByConstant(NTL::to_ZZX(n2));
return ret;
}
/**************** Multiply ****************/
void multiply(FHEcontext& x0, int x1){
FHESecKey x2(x0);
x2.GenSecKey();
cout << unum_eval(unum_add(unum_add(
unum_init(1, x2), unum_mul_plain(unum_init(2, x2), 2)),
unum_init(3, x2)), x2) <<
unum_eval(unum_add(unum_add(unum_init(4, x2),
unum_mul_plain(unum_init(5, x2), 2)),
unum_init(6, x2)), x2) << endl;
}
/*****************************************
End of C Generated Code
*******************************************/
int main(){
long m = 0; // Specific modulus
long p = 1021;
// Plaintext base [default=2], should be a prime number
long r = 1; // Lifting [default=1]
long L = 16;
// Number of levels in the modulus chain [default=heuristic]
long c = 3;
// Number of columns in key-switching matrix [default=2]
long w = 64;
// Hamming weight of secret key
long d = 0;
// Degree of the field extension [default=1]
long k = 128;
// Security parameter [default=80]
long s = 0;
// Minimum number of slots [default=0]
m = FindM(k, L, c, p, d, s, 0);
FHEcontext context(m, p, r);
buildModChain(context, L, c);
NTL::ZZX G = context.alMod.getFactorsOverZZ()[0];
multiply(context, 0);
return 0;
}
Figure 16: Generated HElib program that computes matrix-vector multipli-
cation of Array(Array(1, 2, 3), Array(4, 5, 6)) and Array(1, 2,
1). For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of
obtaining them at runtime.
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#include <stdlib.h>
#include <tfhe/tfhe.h>
#include "ir.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
static inline LweSample* add(const LweSample* a,
const LweSample* b, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
fhe_add(ret, a, b, size, bk);
return ret;
}
static inline LweSample* unum_init(uint64_t value,
uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
for(uint64_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
bootsSymEncrypt(&ret[i], ((uint64_t) value>>i)&1, bk);
}
return ret;
}
static inline LweSample* unum_mul_plain(const LweSample* a,
const int b, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* c_b =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
for(uint64_t i = 0; i < size; i ++) {
bootsCONSTANT(&c_b[i], ((uint64_t) b>>i)&1, bk);
}
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
fhe_mul(ret, a, c_b, size, bk);
return ret;
}
static inline uint64_t unum_eval(const LweSample* a,
uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* key) {
assert(size <= 64);
uint64_t res[size];
uint64_t ret = 0;
for(uint64_t i=0; i<size; i++){
res[i] = bootsSymDecrypt(&a[i], key)>0;
}
for(uint64_t i=0; i<size; i++){
ret |= ((uint64_t) res[i])<<((uint64_t) i);
}
return ret;
}
void multiply(TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* x0,
TFheGateBootstrappingParameterSet* x1){
TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* x2 =
new_random_gate_bootstrapping_secret_keyset(x1);
x0 = &x2->cloud;
const LweSample** x3 =
(const LweSample**)malloc(2 * sizeof(const LweSample*));
LweSample* x4 = add(unum_init(1, 64 ,x2), x3[0], 64 , x0);
x3[0] = x4;
LweSample* x5 = add(unum_mul_plain(
unum_init(2, 64 ,x2), 2, 64, x0), x4, 64 , x0);
x3[0] = x5;
LweSample* x6 = add(unum_init(3, 64 ,x2), x5, 64 , x0);
x3[0] = x6;
printf("%ld\n", unum_eval(x6, 64, x2));
x3[1] = add(unum_init(6, 64 ,x2),
add(unum_mul_plain(unum_init(5, 64 ,x2), 2, 64, x0),
add(unum_init(4, 64 ,x2), x3[1], 64, x0), 64, x0), 64, x0);
}
int main(){
const int minimum_lambda = 110;
TFheGateBootstrappingParameterSet* params =
new_default_gate_bootstrapping_parameters(minimum_lambda);
uint32_t seed[] = { 314, 1592, 657 };
tfhe_random_generator_setSeed(seed,3);
TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* s_key =
new_random_gate_bootstrapping_secret_keyset(params);
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* c_key = &s_key->cloud;
multiply(NULL, params);
return 0;
}
Figure 17: Generated TFHE code that computes matrix-vector multipli-
cation of Array(Array(1, 2, 3), Array(4, 5, 6)) and Array(1, 2,
1). For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of
obtaining them at runtime.
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <tfhe/tfhe.h>
#include "ir.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
/************* Functions **************/
static inline LweSample* add(const LweSample* a,
const LweSample* b, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
fhe_add(ret, a, b, size, bk);
return ret;
}
LweSample* num_array_init(const uint64_t bit_width,
const TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* bk,
const uint64_t size, ...){
va_list valist;
va_start(valist, size);
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(bit_width * size,
bk->params);
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < size ; i ++) {
uint64_t tmp = va_arg(valist, int);
for(uint64_t j = 0; j < bit_width; j ++) {
bootsSymEncrypt(&ret[i * bit_width + j],
((uint64_t) tmp>>j)&1, bk);
}
}
va_end(valist);
return ret;
}
static inline LweSample* num_init(uint64_t value, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
for(uint64_t i = 0; i < size; i ++) {
bootsSymEncrypt(&ret[i], ((uint64_t) value>>i)&1, bk);
}
return ret;
}
static inline LweSample* num_leq(const LweSample* a,
const LweSample* b, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext(bk->params);
fhe_compare_signed(ret, a, b, size, bk);
return ret;
}
static inline LweSample* num_array_index(const LweSample* i,
const LweSample* arr, uint64_t length, uint64_t bit_width,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample * res =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(bit_width, bk->params);
fhe_array_index(res, i, arr, length, bit_width, bk);
return res;
}
static inline LweSample* num_less(const LweSample* a,
const LweSample* b, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext(bk->params);
LweSample* t1 =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
LweSample* t2 =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size, bk->params);
fhe_neg(t1, b, size, bk);
fhe_add(t2, a, t1, size, bk);
bootsCOPY(ret, &t2[size-1], bk);
return ret;
}
static inline LweSample* bit_and(const LweSample* a,
const LweSample* b,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret = new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext(bk->params);
bootsAND(ret, a, b, bk);
return ret;
}
Figure 18: Generated TFHE program that merge sort an array of [3, 1, 5, 2].
For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of obtaining
them at runtime. (part 1)
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static inline LweSample* num_mux(const LweSample* a,
const LweSample* b, const LweSample* c, uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* bk) {
LweSample* ret =
new_gate_bootstrapping_ciphertext_array(size,
bk->params);
fhe_mux(ret, a, b, c, size, bk);
return ret;
}
static inline int64_t num_eval(const LweSample* a,
uint64_t size,
const TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* key) {
assert(size <= 64);
uint64_t res[size];
int64_t ret = 0;
for(uint64_t i=0; i<size; i++){
res[i] = bootsSymDecrypt(&a[i], key)>0;
}
if(res[size-1]!=0){
for(uint64_t i=0; i<size; i++){
res[i] = 1 - res[i];
ret |= ((uint64_t) res[i]<<((uint64_t) i));
}
ret = -(ret + 1);
}
else{
for(uint64_t i=0; i<size; i++){
ret |= ((uint64_t) res[i]<<((uint64_t) i));
}
}
return ret;
}
/**************** MergeSort ****************/
void MergeSort(TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* x0,
TFheGateBootstrappingParameterSet* x1){
TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* x2 =
new_random_gate_bootstrapping_secret_keyset(x1);
x0 = &x2->cloud;
LweSample* x3 = num_array_init(16, x2, 2, 5 ,8);
LweSample* x4 = num_array_init(16, x2, 2, 2 ,4);
LweSample* x5 = num_init(0, 16, x2);
LweSample* x6 = num_init(0, 16, x2);
LweSample* x7 = num_leq(
num_array_index(x5, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x6, x4, 2, 16, x0), 16 , x0);
const LweSample* x8 =
num_less(x5, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
const LweSample* x9 =
num_less(x6, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
LweSample* x10 = bit_and(x8, x9, x0);
LweSample* x11 = num_mux(num_mux(add(x5,
num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0), x5, x7, 16 , x0),
num_mux(add(x5, num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0),
x5, x8, 16 , x0), x10, 16 , x0);
LweSample* x12 = num_mux(num_mux(x6, add(x6,
num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0), x7, 16 , x0),
num_mux(add(x6, num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0),
x6, x9, 16 , x0), x10, 16 , x0);
LweSample* x13 = num_leq(
num_array_index(x11, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x12, x4, 2, 16, x0), 16 , x0);
const LweSample* x14 =
num_less(x11, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
const LweSample* x15 =
num_less(x12, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
LweSample* x16 = bit_and(x14, x15, x0);
LweSample* x17 = num_mux(num_mux(
add(x11, num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0),
x11, x13, 16 , x0), num_mux(
add(x11, num_init(1, 16 ,x2),
16, x0), x11, x14, 16 , x0), x16, 16 , x0);
LweSample* x18 =
num_mux(num_mux(x12,
add(x12, num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0),
x13, 16 , x0), num_mux(add(x12, num_init(1, 16 ,x2),
16, x0), x12, x15, 16 , x0), x16, 16 , x0);
LweSample* x19 =
num_leq(num_array_index(x17, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x18, x4, 2, 16, x0), 16 , x0);
const LweSample* x20 =
num_less(x17, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
Figure 19: Generated TFHE program that merge sort an array of [3, 1, 5, 2].
For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of obtaining
them at runtime. (part 2)
const LweSample* x21 =
num_less(x18, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
LweSample* x22 = bit_and(x20, x21, x0);
LweSample* x23 = num_mux(num_mux(add(x17,
num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0), x17, x19, 16 , x0),
num_mux(add(x17, num_init(1, 16 ,x2),
16, x0), x17, x20, 16 , x0), x22, 16 , x0);
LweSample* x24 = num_mux(num_mux(x18,
add(x18, num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0), x19, 16 , x0),
num_mux(add(x18, num_init(1, 16 ,x2), 16, x0),
x18, x21, 16 , x0), x22, 16 , x0);
const LweSample* x25 =
num_less(x23, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0);
printf("%ld\n", num_eval(num_mux(num_mux(
num_array_index(x5, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x6, x4, 2, 16, x0), x7, 16 , x0),
num_mux(num_array_index(x5, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x6, x4, 2, 16, x0), x8, 16 , x0),
x10, 16 , x0), 16, x2));
printf("%ld\n", num_eval(num_mux(num_mux(
num_array_index(x11, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x12, x4, 2, 16, x0), x13, 16 , x0),
num_mux(num_array_index(x11, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x12, x4, 2, 16, x0), x14, 16 , x0),
x16, 16 , x0), 16, x2));
printf("%ld\n", num_eval(num_mux(num_mux(
num_array_index(x17, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x18, x4, 2, 16, x0), x19, 16 , x0),
num_mux(num_array_index(x17, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x18, x4, 2, 16, x0), x20, 16 , x0),
x22, 16 , x0), 16, x2));
printf("%ld\n", num_eval(num_mux(num_mux(
num_array_index(x23, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x24, x4, 2, 16, x0),
num_leq(num_array_index(x23, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x24, x4, 2, 16, x0), 16 , x0), 16 , x0),
num_mux(num_array_index(x23, x3, 2, 16, x0),
num_array_index(x24, x4, 2, 16, x0), x25, 16 , x0),
bit_and(x25, num_less(x24, num_init(2, 16 ,x2), 16 , x0),
x0), 16 , x0), 16, x2));
}
int main(){
const int minimum_lambda = 110;
TFheGateBootstrappingParameterSet* params =
new_default_gate_bootstrapping_parameters(minimum_lambda);
uint32_t seed[] = { 314, 1592, 657 };
tfhe_random_generator_setSeed(seed,3);
TFheGateBootstrappingSecretKeySet* s_key =
new_random_gate_bootstrapping_secret_keyset(params);
const TFheGateBootstrappingCloudKeySet* c_key = &s_key->cloud;
MergeSort(NULL, params);
return 0;
}
Figure 20: Generated TFHE program that merge sort an array of [3, 1, 5, 2].
For simplicity, the program uses plaintext values as input instead of obtaining
them at runtime. (part 3)
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